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Abstract
A run-time monitor shares computational resources, such as memory and CPU time,
with the target program. Furthermore, heavy computation performed by a monitor
for checking target program’s execution with respect to requirement properties can
be a bottleneck to the target program’s execution. Therefore, computational char-
acteristics of run-time monitoring cause a signiﬁcant impact on the target program’s
execution.
We investigate computational issues on run-time monitoring. The ﬁrst issue is
the power of run-time monitoring. In other words, we study the class of properties
run-time monitoring can evaluate. The second issue is computational complexity
of evaluating properties written in process algebraic language. Third, we discuss
sound abstraction of the target program’s execution, which does not change the
result of property evaluation. This abstraction can be used as a technique to reduce
monitoring overhead. Theoretical understanding obtained from these issues aﬀects
the implementation of Java-MaC, a toolset for the run-time monitoring and checking
of Java programs. Finally, we demonstrate the abstraction-based overhead reduction
technique implemented in Java-MaC through a case study.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of run-time analysis based on formal requirements is to bridge the
gap left by the two traditional analysis techniques: veriﬁcation and testing.
On the one hand, formal veriﬁcation analyzes all possible executions of the
system, but the analysis is performed on the speciﬁcation of the system, not
its implementation. In addition, state-of-the-art veriﬁcation techniques still
do not scale up well to handle large systems. On the other hand, testing is
applied to a system implementation, but does not guarantee that all behaviors
of the implementation are explored and analyzed. In either case, run-time
analysis can provide additional assurance that the current execution is correct
with respect to its requirements. Run-time analysis can ﬁnd violations to the
requirements in time and help users to take recovery actions before critical
failure happens.
While this additional assurance is an invaluable help to detect and recover
errors, this beneﬁt comes at the cost of slowed target program’s execution
due to monitoring overhead. Monitoring overhead consists of two factors: in-
formation extraction overhead and evaluation overhead. Information extrac-
tion overhead occurs due to the execution of probes inserted into the target
system. Evaluation overhead occurs when a monitor evaluates requirement
properties. Unless special hardware is attached to the target system for inter-
cepting execution information, probes inserted into the target system share
computational resources, such as memory and CPU time, of the target sys-
tem to extract execution information. Evaluation overhead, however, occurs
even when special hardware is utilized. Suppose that the requirement prop-
erties are large and complex. Then, the speed of evaluating the properties
is slower than the execution speed of the target program, which makes the
target program wait until the evaluation ﬁnishes. Probes send snapshots of
the target program’s execution to the (ﬁnite) snapshot buﬀer based on which
a monitor evaluates the properties. When the snapshot buﬀer becomes full,
probe should stop the target program’s execution until the buﬀer has room.
Some monitoring system [2] prevents the target system from waiting for the
monitor by overwriting snapshots while a monitor is busy to evaluate prop-
erties. This approach, however, cannot guarantee correct evaluation and is
not adequate for run-time veriﬁcation. As described above, computational
characteristics of run-time monitoring, especially property evaluation, cause a
signiﬁcant impact on target program execution.
We investigate computational issues on run-time monitoring which are not
limited to speciﬁc monitoring architecture, but universal. The ﬁrst issue is
on the computational power of run-time monitoring. In other words, we in-
vestigate the class of properties which run-time monitoring can evaluate at
run-time, i.e, in ﬁnite time. We show that this class of properties does not
coincide with safety properties, but a strict subset of safety properties. The
second issue we study is computational complexity of evaluating properties
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written in process algebraic language. We formulated this problem as a trace
validity problem and proved that the evaluating properties written in CCS is
a NP-complete problem using 3SAT problem. As far as we know, these results
are new contributions to the run-time monitoring ﬁeld. Finally, we develop a
sound abstraction technique on target program execution so that a monitor
evaluates properties less frequently but does not miss violation to the proper-
ties. This technique, called value abstraction, can be used to reduce monitoring
overhead. We demonstrate this overhead reduction technique implemented in
Java-MaC in the case study of monitoring the Sieve of Eratosthenes program.
Section 2 shows that the class of properties run-time monitoring can evalu-
ate is a strict subset of safety properties. Section 3 proves that the problem of
evaluating properties written in process algebra is NP-complete. Section 4 ex-
plains value abstraction. Section 5 brieﬂy describes Java-MaC and the impact
of previously mentioned issues on Java-MaC. Section 6 shows the experimen-
tal result of applying value abstraction to monitor the Sieve of Eratosthenes.
Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 A Class of Monitorable Properties
Run-time monitoring has weaker power of evaluating requirement properties
than veriﬁcation has. It is because run-time monitoring observes target pro-
gram execution of ﬁnite length while veriﬁcation searches whole (possibly
inﬁnite) execution. Thus, it is obvious that run-time monitoring cannot eval-
uate liveness properties. We generally presume that the class of properties
run-time monitoring can evaluate is safety properties. In this section, how-
ever, we study the class of properties run-time monitoring can evaluate more
precisely. We call a property run-time monitoring can evaluate as “a moni-
torable property”. We start discussion on monitorable properties by deﬁning
“execution” and “property” formally.
Deﬁnition 1 (Execution) An execution of a program is an inﬁnite sequence
of program states σ = s0s1... where si ∈ S (a set of program states), s0 ∈ Sinit
(a set of initial states), and σ[i..j] is the subsequence of σ from a state si to a
state sj.
The deﬁnition of an execution can apply to ﬁnite sequences by obtaining an
inﬁnite sequence from a ﬁnite one by repeating the ﬁnal state of the ﬁnite
sequence. This corresponds to the view that a terminating execution is the
same as non-terminating execution in which after some ﬁnite time (once the
program has terminated ) the state remains ﬁxed.
Deﬁnition 2 (Property) A property is a set of executions. We write σ |= P
to denote that σ is in property P .
Let us deﬁne safety property formally. Informally speaking, safety prop-
erty means that bad things do not happen during the execution of a program.
Consider a safety property Psafe that means some bad thing x does not hap-
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pen. If σ |= Psafe, σ includes some bad thing which cannot be remedied. In
other words, there is some preﬁx of σ which includes some bad thing for which
no extension will satisfy Psafe. We use S
ω as the set of inﬁnite sequences of
states.
Deﬁnition 3 (Safety Property) A property P ⊆ Sω is a safety property if
for every σ ∈ Sω, σ ∈ P if and only if ∀i∃β ∈ Sω(σ[0..i]β ∈ P ) where S is
the set of program states.
It is clear from Deﬁnition 3 that a monitorable property is a safety property.
A monitor can evaluate a property based on only a ﬁnite number of execution
states. A safety property, however, is not necessarily a monitorable property.
The deﬁnition of safety property makes no computational assumptions ; it is
possible to deﬁne a property that is a safety property, but which is unlikely
to be monitorable. Safety closure of the halting problem is a safety property
but not a monitorable property.
Example 1 Let Σ = {0, 1, a, b}. Consider a ﬁnite property H∗ = {x · a ·
y | x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗, the Turing Machine encoded by x halts on input y}. We
deﬁne a property Hω = H∗ · bω ∪ {0, 1}∗ · a · {0, 1}ω ∪ {0, 1}ω.
The property Hω, deﬁned above is a safety property. In order to see this,
we only need to observe that for any execution not in Hω, there is ﬁnite preﬁx
when this violation can be detected. Executions not in Hω are those that are
not in the “right format”, or where the ﬁnite preﬁx before the sequence of b’s
is not in H∗; in both cases there is a ﬁnite preﬁx that provides evidence of the
execution not being in the property.
However, in order to detect that an execution σ is not in Hω, we have to
check for membership inH∗. Since membership inH∗ (or the Halting problem)
is not decidable, it is impossible for us to design monitors that would be able to
detect a violation of this property. This suggests that the class of monitorable
properties is a strict subset of a class of safety properties (see Figure 1); they
should be such that sequences not in the properties should be recognizable by
a Turing Machine, after examining a ﬁnite preﬁx. Therefore, we can deﬁne a
monitorable property as follows. 4 We use pref(σ) for σ ∈ Sω as the set of all
ﬁnite preﬁxes of σ.
Deﬁnition 4 (Monitorable Property) A property P ⊆ Sω is said to be
monitorable if and only if P is a safety property and S∗\pref(P ) is recursively
enumerable, where pref(P ) = ∪σ∈Ppref(σ)
3 Evaluation of Properties in Process Algebra
Requirement properties need to be described in a property speciﬁcation lan-
guage. The characteristics of the property speciﬁcation language can aﬀect the
4 For more detailed discussion on monitorable language, see [8].
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Fig. 1. Monitorable properties
computational complexity of evaluating properties. [7] shows the monitoring
overhead due to non-determisim in requirement properties in their monitoring
system, called Supervisor, and provides heuristics to decrease the overhead.
[3] develops a linear time monitoring algorithm for safety formulae written in
past time LTL. In this section, we will discuss the computational complexity
of monitoring algorithm for property written in process algebra.
Run-time monitoring can be thought of as a trace validity problem where
a trace is generated from the execution of the program. The trace validity
problem is a membership checking problem of deciding whether a given trace is
in the set of valid traces. For suﬃciently expressive requirement speciﬁcation
languages such as CCS [6] or ACSR [1], this problem turns out to be NP-
complete. We formulate the trace validity problem using the notation of [6].
3.1 Notations
We will denote the ith character in a string x by x(i). A is an set of names
a, b, c, .... Then, A is the set of co-names a, b, c, ...; A and A are disjoint and
are in bijection via (−); we declare a = a. L = A∪A denotes the set of labels.
We also introduce a distinguished silent action τ ∈ L. We set Act = L ∪ {τ}.
Deﬁnition 5 The set of processes is deﬁned by
P ::= Nil | α.P | P + Q | P ||Q | P\L
where L ⊆ L and α ∈ Act.
Deﬁnition 6 The labeled transition relation
α→ between two processes is de-
ﬁned by the following rules. In the following rules, α ∈ Act, l ∈ L, and L ⊆ L.
[Prefix]
α.P
α→ P
[Choice]
P
α→ P ′
P +Q
α→ P ′
Q
α→ Q′
P +Q
α→ Q′
[Parallel]
P
α→ P ′
P ||Q α→ P ′||Q
Q
α→ Q′
P ||Q α→ P ||Q′
P
l→ P ′, Q l→ Q′
P ||Q τ→ P ′||Q′
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[Restriction]
P
α→ P ′
P\L α→ P ′ where α ∈ L ∪ L
Deﬁnition 7 Given processes P and P ′, and α ∈ L, we say that P α⇒ P ′ if
P (
τ→)∗ α→ ( τ→)∗P ′, where ( τ→)∗ is the transitive reﬂexive closure of τ→.
3.2 Trace Validity Problem
In this section, we formulate the trace validity problem using the notations in
Section 3.1.
Deﬁnition 8 (Valid Trace) A string s ∈ L∗, of length n, is said to be a
valid trace of a process P , if there exist processes P0, P1, . . . , Pn, such that
P ≡ P0, and P(i−1) s
(i)⇒ Pi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
Then, the Trace Validity Problem is formally deﬁned as follows:
Input A process P and a string s ∈ L∗.
Output Is s a valid trace of P?
Theorem 3.1 The trace validity problem is NP-complete.
Proof.
To prove hardness, we reduce 3SAT to the trace validity problem. We
are given a formula ϕ in conjunctive normal form with variables x1, . . . , xn
and clauses C1, . . . , Cm, each with three literals. We construct a process P (ϕ)
and a string s(ϕ) such that s(ϕ) is a valid trace of P (ϕ) iﬀ the formula ϕ is
satisﬁable.
For each i, deﬁne processes, Xi, as follows,
Xi
def
= τ.Fi + τ.Ti
Fi
def
= fi.Fi
Ti
def
= ti.Ti
In our reduction, these processes express a truth value assignment to the
variables. If the Xi
τ→ Fi then it expresses the fact that under this assignment
the variable xi gets the value false, and if Xi
τ→ Ti then it means that the
variable xi gets the value true.
In addition to these processes, we deﬁne another process, P . The idea is
that P will deadlock, when run concurrently with the processes Xi, iﬀ the
truth assignment deﬁned (as above) by the processes Xi is not a satisfying
truth assignment for the formula ϕ.
In order to deﬁne the process P , we assume that Ci ≡ li,1 ∨ li,2 ∨ li,3 for
i ∈ {1, . . .m} and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} in following formulas.
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P
def
= Q1
Q1
def
= a.L1,1 + a.L1,2 + a.L1,3
...
Qi
def
= a.Li,1 + a.Li,2 + a.Li,3
Li,j
def
=


fk.L
′
i,j if li,j ≡ ¬xk
tk.L
′
i,j if li,j ≡ xk
L′i,j
def
= b.Qi+1
...
L′m,j
def
= b.Q1
The process P (ϕ) is thus (P ||X1|| · · · ||Xn) \ {t1, f1, . . . , tn, fn}. The prop-
erty this process has is that, for any i, j, the transition Li,j → L′i,j can be
taken iﬀ the literal li,j gets the truth value true under the truth assignment
deﬁned by the processes X1, . . . , Xn. Hence, Qi →∗ Qi+1 can take place iﬀ one
of the literals in the clause Ci gets the truth value true under the assignment
described by X1, . . . , Xn. Thus it can be seen that abab . . . ab is a valid trace
of P (ϕ) iﬀ ϕ has a satisfying assignment.
To prove completeness, we prove that Trace Validity Problem belongs to
NP. We can view a process P as a labeled transition graph GP over a set of
label L rooted at the node nP . For a given process P and a string s ∈ L∗, we
choose a path p corresponding to s from nP be the certiﬁcate. Checking can
be accomplished in polynomial time by traversing GP from nP following p.
✷
The main reason for NP-completeness in the trace validity problem is non-
determinism caused by parallel composition of processes. We should be careful
to deﬁne or use a requirement property speciﬁcation language so that trace
validation against properties is tractable.
4 Abstraction of Program Execution
Computational characteristic of run-time monitoring is closely related to ab-
stract view on the target program execution. In this section, we provide an
abstract view on the target program execution. An execution of a program is
a sequence of program states as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1. We deﬁne a state as
follows.
Deﬁnition 9 (State) A state s of a program execution is a pair of a time
stamp ts ∈ R and an environment ρs ⊆ V → R which is a function from a
set of variables V to a set of real values R.
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A state in an execution indicates variable change(s) at the time instant
corresponding to the state. ρsi , however, does not change between time in-
terval starting from a state si until the next state si+1; the information of a
program remains ﬁxed between two states si and si+1. If we keep track of
variable updates, we can capture snapshots of si’s.
Note that not all variables relate to requirement properties. A property p1
may consist of expressions based on a variable v1, but not v2. Furthermore,
not every update of v1 changes evaluation of p1. In other words, a monitor can
abstract out states whose updated variable values do not aﬀect evaluation of
p1. We call this abstraction value abstraction. Value abstraction is a function
from an execution to a shorter execution consisting of less states. Let us
formulate value abstraction formally. We will use S∞ denoting S∗∪Sω. Value
abstraction γexpVm abstracts out states which do not aﬀect expVm , a set of
boolean expressions over the monitored variables Vm.
Deﬁnition 10 (Value Abstraction) A value abstraction γexpVm with regard
to expVm, a set of boolean expressions over monitored variables Vm is a function
γexpVm : S
ω → S∞. γexpVm is deﬁned recursively as follows.
γexpVm (sisi+1σ
′)=


γexpVm (siσ
′) if ∀e ∈ expVm .[[e]]ρsi = [[e]]ρsi+1
siγexpVm (si+1σ
′) if ∃e ∈ expVm .[[e]]ρsi = [[e]]ρsi+1
where σ′ is an inﬁnite sequence of states, [[e]]ρsi for e ∈ expVm is the result of
evaluating an boolean expression e according to an environment ρsi, and i ≥ 0.
Note that Deﬁnition 10 itself does not impose any restriction on the set
expVm except that boolean expressions in the expVm should be expressions over
the monitored variables Vm. For value abstraction to be useful, expVm should
be related to requirement properties propreq.
Deﬁnition 11 (Valid Value Abstraction) Value abstraction γexpVm is valid
with regard to the set of requirement properties propreq if and only if
∀j ≥ 0.
(
∀e ∈ expVm .[[e]]ρsj = [[e]]ρsj+1 −→ ∀p ∈ propreq.[[p]]ρsj = [[p]]ρsj+1
)
Deﬁnition 11 indicates that the removed states must not aﬀect evaluation of
requirement properties. The remaining states, however, may or may not aﬀect
evaluation result. In other words, valid value abstraction is sound, but not
complete.
So far, we have not decided how to set expVm with regard to propreq. In
one extreme end, expVm can be a set of entire requirement properties, i.e.,
expVm = propreq. In this case, the abstract view taken by the monitor is equal
to a sequence of fail/safe ﬂags obtained by evaluating requirement properties.
In the other extreme end, expVm can be an empty set. In this case, no states are
removed by value abstraction. We need to decide a point between these two
extreme ends for setting expVm with regard to propreq satisfying Deﬁnition 11.
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For example, suppose that a requirement property is
preq = ((3 < x) ∧ (x < 10)) ∨ (y > 2) ∧ (z < 10)
One expVm satisfying Deﬁnition 11 with regard to preq is
expVm = {(3 < x) ∧ (x < 10), z < 10}
With this expVm , for example, states updating x from 4 to 9 or states updating
z from 1 to 9 are removed by value abstraction because these states do not
change evaluation result of (3 < x) ∧ (x < 10) or z < 10.
In practice, value abstraction is closely related to reduce monitoring over-
head. To apply value abstraction, a probe need to test ∀e ∈ expVm .[[e]]ρsi =
[[e]]ρsi+1 (see Deﬁnition 10) whenever a monitored variable is updated. There-
fore, we have to consider both property evaluation overhead and probe’s test
overhead to reduce the overall monitoring overhead. Section 5.3 describes how
Java-MaC implements value abstraction.
5 Overview of the Java-MaC
The monitoring and checking (MaC) framework has been designed to ensure
that the execution of a real-time system is consistent with its requirements
at run-time. Java-MaC instruments Java bytecodes and monitors/checks the
correctness of the Java program’s execution with regard to given formal re-
quirement speciﬁcation. The structure of the Java-MaC architecture is shown
in Fig 2. The architecture includes two main phases: static phase and run-
time phase. A formal speciﬁcation consists of a low-level implementation de-
pendent speciﬁcation and a high-level requirement speciﬁcation. A low-level
speciﬁcation language is called Primitive Event Deﬁnition Language (PEDL).
A high-level speciﬁcation language is called Meta Event Deﬁnition Language
(MEDL). From a target program and PEDL/MEDL speciﬁcations, the static
phase (before a target program runs) automatically generates run-time com-
ponents including a ﬁlter, an event recognizer, and a run-time checker. In
the run-time phase (during the execution of a target program), information of
the target program execution is collected and checked against a given formal
requirement speciﬁcation. More detail on Java-MaC can be found in[4,5]
Section 5.1 describes static phase of Java-MaC. Section 5.2 describes run-
time phase of Java-MaC. Finally, Section 5.3 explains implementation of value
abstraction in Java-MaC.
5.1 Static Phase
Java-MaC has three static phase components: an instrumentor, a PEDL com-
piler, and a MEDL compiler. A PEDL compiler compiles a PEDL script into
an abstract syntax tree (pedl.out) which is evaluated by an event recognizer
at run-time. At the same time, a PEDL compiler generates instrumenta-
tion information (instrumentation.out) which is used by the instrumentor.
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Fig. 2. Structure of Java-MaC
In addition, a PEDL compiler generates expVm for value abstraction from
a PEDL script and puts expVm into instrumentation.out. A Java-MaC in-
strumentor takes a Java bytecode (*.class) and instrumentation information
(instrumentation.out) containing a list of monitored variables/methods and
expVm generated from a PEDL script. Based on these inputs, the Java-MaC
instrumentor inserts a ﬁlter consisting of probes into the target bytecode.
Each probe contains a routine testing whether ∀e ∈ expVm .[[e]]ρsi = [[e]]ρsi+1 as
well as a routine for sending variable updates to an event recognizer.
A MEDL compiler compiles a MEDL script into an abstract syntax tree
(medl.out) which is evaluated by a run-time checker at run-time. More details
of instrumentor and PEDL/MEDL compilers are in [5].
5.2 Run-time Phase
During the run-time phase, the instrumented target program is executed while
being monitored and checked with respect to a requirement speciﬁcation.
A ﬁlter is a collection of probes inserted into the target program. The
essential functionality of a ﬁlter is to keep track of changes of monitored vari-
ables and send snapshots of program execution states to the event recognizer.
Furthermore, a ﬁlter tests ∀e ∈ expVm .[[e]]ρsi = [[e]]ρsi+1 to decide whether a
snapshot should be sent to the event recognizer or not. An event recognizer
detects an event from the state information received from the ﬁlter. Events
are recognized according to a low-level speciﬁcation. Recognized events are
sent to the run-time checker. Although it is conceivable to combine the event
recognizer with the ﬁlter, we chose to separate them to provide ﬂexibility in an
implementation of the architecture. A run-time checker determines whether
or not the current execution history satisﬁes a requirement speciﬁcation. The
execution history is captured from a sequence of events sent by the event
recognizer. The connection among these run-time components can be made
through one of socket, FIFO ﬁle, or user deﬁned communication methods.
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5.3 Implementation of Value Abstraction
Java-MaC sets expVm as a set of simple expressions obtained from event and
condition deﬁnitions in a PEDL script. 5 A simple expression consists of one
variable, a comparison operator, and a constant (ex. x < 5.4). For this set
of expVm , the amount of computation performed by probes for testing ∀e ∈
expVm .[[e]]ρsi = [[e]]ρsi+1 is very little because comparison between a variable
and a constant is computationally cheap; probes do not perform any boolean
operations or numerical operations for the test.
Construction of expVm from a PEDL script is as follows.
(i) Extract simple expressions sevij for each monitored variable vi from event
deﬁnitions and condition deﬁnitions in a PEDL script.
(ii) Unless either
• there exists a non-simple expression containing monitored variable vi
• there exists update(vi) in event/condition deﬁnitions 6
put sevij into expVm .
If expVm contains sevij, apply value abstraction whenever vi is updated. Oth-
erwise, send vi to an event recognizer whenever vi is updated. When value
abstraction is applied, a probe monitoring a variable vi tests all sevij ∈ expVm
whenever vi is updated. If any simple expression sevij fails the test, i.e. there
exists an sevij which has changed its value according to update of vi, the probe
sends a new value of vi. Otherwise, not.
Consider the following example.
condition c1 = (3 < x && x < 10) || z > 10;
condition c2 = x > 5 && y > 2*z + 3;
The variable x is used only in simple expressions. The ﬁlter keeps the truth
values of each of the three simple expressions (3 < x, x < 10, and x > 5)
that involve x and sends an update only when it changes one of the expression
values as in Figure 3. Variables y and z are used in an expression which is not
a simple expression. Thus, every update of y and z will be sent to the event
recognizer. Whether value abstraction can be applied to a variable x or not
can be decided by scanning a PEDL script by a PEDL compiler.
6 Example: the Sieve of Eratosthenes
We illustrate monitoring overhead and eﬀectiveness of value abstraction using
the Sieve of Eratosthenes program. The Sieve of Eratosthenes generates prime
numbers. The algorithm of the Sieve for generating prime numbers less than
5 We assume that all of event/condition deﬁnitions in a PEDL script are used to build
requirement properties in a MEDL script.
6 update(vi) becomes true whenever vi is updated.
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time
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Fig. 3. Example of updating x
or equal to n can be described as follows.
Make a list of all the integers less than or equal to n (and greater than one).
Strike out the multiples of all primes less than or equal to
√
n, then the numbers
that are left are the primes. 7
We would like to monitor and check whether there exists a prime number
between 99990 and 100000. For that purpose, an event foundPrime is deﬁned
in lines 5 to 7 of Figure 4. The experiment shows that there exists one prime
between 99990 and 100000.
01:MonScr
02: export event foundPrime;
03: monobj int SieveMain.sa.numTested;
04: monobj int SieveMain.sa.numPrimes;
05: event foundPrime = update(SieveMain.sa.numPrimes) when
06: (99990 <= SieveMain.sa.numTested
07: && SieveMain.sa.numTested <= 100000);
08:end
Fig. 4. PEDL script for checking the existence of prime between 99990 and 100000
Figure 5 shows a Java code for the Sieve of Eratosthenes. An integer
being tested is declared as numTested in line 14. numPrimes declared in line
15 indicates the total number of prime numbers upto numTested. Main code
in execute() from line 22 to line 42 contains a nested loop. Lines 30 to 41
form an outer loop which increases numTested one by one. Lines 33 to 35
make an inner loop which divides numTested with prime numbers less than
or equal to
√
numTested. Lines 37 to 40 store numTested as a prime number
and increase numPrimes by 1 if there is no prime number which can divide
numTested.
The computational complexity of the Sieve program(Figure 5) is O(n
√
n)
(the outer loop takes O(n) and the inner loop takes O(
√
n)) where n is a max-
7 It is well-known mathematical fact that if there exists a prime greater than
√
n which
divides n, there exists a prime less than or equal to
√
n which divides n, too.
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01:public class SieveMain{
02: Sieve sa;
03: SieveMain() { sa = new Sieve();}
04: public static void main(String[] args) {
05: SieveMain sm = new SieveMain();
06: sm.sa.initialize( Integer.parseInt(args[0]));
07: sm.sa.execute();
08: }
09:}
10:class Sieve {
11: public Sieve sa;
12: public int primes[];
13: public int maxCandidate;
14: public int numTested; // current number being tested
15: public int numPrimes; // number of primes found
16:
17: public void initialize(int i) {
18: maxCandidate = i;
19: primes = new int[maxCandidate];
20: }
21:
22: public void execute() {
23: int k = 0;
24: int sqrt_i=0;
25: boolean flag = false;
26:
27: primes[0] = 1;
28: primes[1] = 2;
29: numPrimes = 2;
30: for (numTested = 3; numTested <= maxCandidate; numTested++) {
31: k = 1;
32: sqrt_i = (int)(Math.sqrt(i));
33: for (flag = true; k < numPrimes && flag; k++)
34: if ( primes[k] <= sqrt_i && numTested % primes[k] == 0)
35: flag = false;
36:
37: if (flag) {
38: numPrimes++;
39: primes[numPrimes - 1] = numTested;
40: }
41: }
42: }
43:}
Fig. 5. The code of the Sieve of Eratosthenes
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imum number to check. The Sieve program sends around 1.08×n snapshots
to an event recognizer (n×numTested + 0.08×numPrimes).
We performed the experiment using Linux 2.2 machine (2X 550 Mhz PIII,
1GB memory, IBM JDK 1.3.1) and Windows 2000 machine (1.4Ghz PIV,
512MB memory, Sun JDK 1.3.1). The sieve program runs on Linux ma-
chine. Event recognizer runs on Windows 2000 machine. The bottom line of
Figure 6.a) shows the execution time of the uninstrumented Sieve program.
Testing integers from 1 to 200000 takes 2.3 seconds. Testing integers from 1
to 800000, however, takes 22.6 seconds. The frequency of taking snapshots
decreases as n increases because of O(n
√
n) computational complexity of the
Sieve program, which decreases the overhead ratio by Java-MaC as n increases.
Figure 6.b) shows the overhead ratios of NoAbstract, and ValueAbstract. NoAb-
stract slows down the Sieve program 3.1 times when n is 200000. The overhead
ratio decreases to 1.5 times when n increases to 800000. ValueAbstract reduces
the overhead 73% compared to the overhead of NoAbstract when n is 200000.
As n increases, the bottleneck of event evaluation diminishes, which decreases
the amount of reduction by ValueAbstract.
a) b)
Fig. 6. Overhead to the Sieve of Eratosthenes (a) Execution time (b) Overhead
ratio
7 Conclusion
We have described theoretical study as well as practical implication of compu-
tational characteristics of run-time monitoring. We deﬁne the class of prop-
erties run-time monitoring can evaluate accurately; a class of monitorable
properties is a strict subset of a class of safety properties. In addition, we
proved that evaluating properties written in process algebra takes intractable
time by transforming 3SAT problem to the trace validity problem. Finally, a
sound abstraction of the target program’s execution is developed which ﬁlters
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out states unrelavant to the requirement properties. Java-MaC uses value ab-
straction to reduce the property evaluation overhead. Value abstraction is a
quite eﬀective technique to reduce overhead, as we have seen in the case study
of the Sieve of Erathosthenes, where monitoring overhead is reduced 73% by
value abstraction.
This paper focuses on mathematical treatment of monitoring overhead.
Equally important topic is to measure and limit the range of monitoring over-
head. This topic is important because safety real-time systems require the
upper bound of worst case execution time for their guarantee of correct ex-
ecution. We are investigating real-time JVM as we upgrade Java-MaC to
incorporate steering features. Another topic is to take more advantage of
value abstraction. Current implementation of Java-MaC tests only simple ex-
pressions for value abstraction in order to minimize probe’s overhead. More
aggressive way of applying value abstraction, i.e. setting expVm not only sim-
ple expressions, but more compound ones seems promising. Also, we may
analyze execution history statistically to maximize states reduction of value
abstraction.
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